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Abstract. This paper investigates the economic implications of a comprehensive approach to
greenhouse policies that strives to stabilise the atmospheric concentration of greenhouse gases at
an ecologicaliy determined threshold level. In a theoretical optimisation model conditions for an
efficient allocation of abatement effort among pollutants and over time are derived. The model is
empirically speeified and adapted to a dynamic GAMS-algorithm. By various Simulation runs for
the period of 1990 to 2110, the economics of greenhouse gas aecumulation are explored. In par-
ticular, the long-run cost associated with the above stabilisation target are evaluated for three dif-
ferent policy scenarios: i) a comprehensive approach that covers all major greenhouse gases si-
multaneously, ii) a piecemeal approach that is limited to reducing CO2 emissions, and iii) a ten-
year moratorium that postpones abatcment effort until new scientific cvidence on the greenhouse
effect will become available. Comparing the Simulation results suggests that a piecemeal ap-
proach would considerably increase total cost, whercas a ten-year moratorium might be reason-
able even if the probability of 'good news' is comparatively small.
The authors are solely responsible for the contents of each Kiel Working Paper. Since the series
involves manuscripts in a preliminary form, interested readers are requested to direct criticism
and suggestions directly to the authors and to clear any quotations with them.Introduction
During the last decade, the emergence of global environmental problems (e.g., climate
change and the depletion of the ozone layer) has revealed that the stabil ity of the global
ecological Systems is a necessary precondition for the long-run sustainability of any eco-
nomic development path. With respect to greenhouse policies, sustainability inevitably
requires to stabilise the atmospheric concentration of greenhouse gases (see, e.g., Nord-
wijk Conference, 1989). This, however, does not necessarily imply an immediate stabili-
sation at the current levels. Instead, sustainable greenhouse policies could be guided by
the concept of long-term risk management as recommended by the UNEP Advisory
Group on Greenhouse Gases (see Swart/Hootmans, 1991). This approach aims at defin-
ing short-term emission targets on the basis of long-term stabilisation targets that are in-
tended to safeguard the global environment for future generations by "limiting the risk of
rapid, unpredictable, and non-linear responses that could 1ead to extensive ecosystems
damages" (ibd.).
Compared to cost-benefit-analysis that requires a complete quantification of cost and
(partly unknown) damages, the above approach seems to be a reasonable alternative to
cope with global warming in the presence of uncertainty, irreversibility and possibly
catastrophic consequences.
1 However, in order to stabilise the atmospheric concentration
of greenhouse gases, global emissions would have to be reduced by more than 50%
compared to the current levels (see IPCC, 1990). This, of course, implies a considerable
cost bürden. But there also exist considerable yet unexploited options for cost minimisa-
tion. In particular, the recent discussion on global warming focuses almost exclusively
on the reduction of carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions.
2 However, there is no reason to be-
lieve that a CO2-policy alone will ensure efficiency in terms of Overall abatement cost
because several other trace gases also contribute to global warming (mainly methane,
nitrous oxide, chlorofluorocarbons and tropospheric ozone). Hence, in order to pursue a
given stabilisation target, it may be less costly to refrain in part from the required CO2-
It should be noted that there is no slrict dichotomy belween the above 'critica! loads' approach
and cost-benefit-analysis. Both coneepts tend to eoineide if one recognizes in cost-benefit-
analysis that damages as a funetion of atmospheric concentrations might exhibit threshold ef-
fects caused by non-linear dose-response relations (see, e.g., Dasgupta, 1982).
So far, only few authors have focused on a comprehensive approach that treats all greenhouse
gases simultaneously: Victor (1991), Swart (1992) and Mohr et al. (1992) discuss practical
issues associated with a comprehensive approach like, e.g., the choiee of policy instruments
and monitoring requirements. Nordhaus (1991) estimates cost curves for slowing climate
change that cover reduction measurcs aiming at both carbon dioxide and chlorofluorocarbons.
Michaelis (1992a, 1992b) employs a dynamic optimisalion model to derive conditions for an
efficient allocation of abatement effort among greenhouse gases. Finally, Reilly/Richards
(1993) construet a 'damage index' that incorporates elimatic as well as non-elimatic effects.reduction and to reduce the emissions of, e.g., methane by an amount which is equivalent
in terms of the prevented greenhouse effect.
In the present paper, the theoretical and empirical implications of such a comprehensive
approach to stabilising the global greenhouse will be explored. In particular, a dynamic
GAMS-algorithm will be used to calculate efficient time paths of greenhouse gas control
together with the corresponding cost figures. In Sections 1 and 2, the theoretical model is
introduced and conditions for an efficient solution are derived. In Section 3, the model is
adapted to a Simulation approach by quantifying cost functions and input data. In Sec-
tions 4 through 6, empirical Simulation results for different policy scenarios are reported,
and in Section 7, the paper is completed by some policy conclusions.
1. The Model
The starting point of the present analysis is a generalised version of a model originälly
developed in Michaelis (1992a): Assume there exist n greenhouse gases G; (i=l,2,...,n),
the specific greenhouse warming potentials of which are indicated by a,.
3 Let e;(t) de-
note the basic emission levels that would occur in period t without abatement activities
and let Vj(t) denote the amount of pollutants prevented by abatement activities. The basic
emission levels 6j(t) are assumed to grow with an exogenous rate gj, i.e. es(t)= (l+gj)
1^.
Hence, the amount of Gj actually emitted in period t, e^t), is given by:
*/(0 = ^ + gi)
tei-vi(t). (1)
The emitted gases accumulate in the atmosphere, with sf(t) indicating the stock of G; in
the end of period t. Accumulated Stocks, in turn, are partly degraded by natural proces-
ses. For simplification, it is assumed that these processes can be described by constant
disintegration rates cjj ((kq^l) such that the change in stock between two periods t and
t+1 can be characterised by the difference equation:
sfi+V-sfi) = e,(r + l)-g^(O. (2)
Assuming initial Stocks Sj(0)>0 and converting all gases into CO2-equivalents by^weight-
ing them with their greenhouse coefficients af, the following relationship between initial
The greenhouse warming potentials employed above indicate the amount of CO2 that is
equivalent to one unit of Gj in terms of the instantaneous greenhouse impact. In eontrast to
this, some of the warming potentials used in the literature are calculated in such a way that
they already include the disintegration rate. However, for the present analysis it is more ap-
propriate to separate these two effects by using instantaneous greenhouse warming potentials
in combination with an explicit consideration of the disintegration process.stocks, basic emission levels, abatement activities and the current total stock of green-
house gases, measured in terms of CO2-equivalents, can be derived from (1) and (2):
[ (3)
f=.l T=l ;'=!
Equation (3) serves to define the ecological constraints of the model. Scientific evidence
suggests that the rise in global mean temperature is directly related to the growth in stock
s(t).
4 Moreover, the ecosystem's capability to adapt to global warming is restricted to a
certain maximum rise in mean temperature compared to preindustrial levels (e.g., Swart/
Hootmans, 1991). Hence, it is assumed that s(t) is not allowed to exceed an exogenously
given limit of s° units that corresponds to the maximum permissible increase in tempera-
ture. However, as pointed out by the UNEP's Advisory Group on Greenhouse Gases, the
ecosystems' adaptive capability depends not only on the absolute increase in temperature,
but also on the rate of change in temperature (ibd.).
5 Consequently, it is assumed that s(t)
has to satisfy the additional constraint s(t)s(l+Y)s(t-l), where y indicates the maximum
permissible rate of growth in stock s(t).
6 In Section 4, both constraints on s(t) will be
quantified using the well-known relationship between radiative forcing, climate feedback
and global warming (see, e.g., Cline, 1992).
Finally, the economics of greenhouse gas control are characterised by n abatement cost
functions (l+fy^^Cifv^t)], where SJSO indicates the rate of technical progress in pollution
control, and c,[Vj(t)] is assumed to exhibit the usual properties:
f^ lim f^ = ~, Mm ^ = 0, and d
2c, / ^(t)
2 > 0. (4)
^(0 0fy(0
3. Derivation of the Efficient Solution
Consider a central planning agency setting up plans for a finite time horizon of T periods
t=l,2,...T. In order to obtain the efficient combination of abatement activities among
greenhouse gases and over time, the agency has to minimize the present value of aggre-
4 Note that for a given volume of the atmosphere there is a constant relationship between the
stock of greenhouse gases and their atmospheric concentrations.
5 For example, the Advisory Group expects that "a maximum rate of sea level rise less than 2
centimetres per decade would permit the vast majority of vulnerable ecosystems, such as
coastal wetlands and coral reefs, to adapt; more than 5 centimetres per decade would rap-
idly increase damages to ecosystems" (Swart/Hootsmans, 1991, p.130).
6 An alternative (less demanding) way to cope with this problem is to fix an exogenously deter-
mined target path s(t)=s*(t) that is assumed to satisfy both constraints (see Michaelis, 1992b).gated abatement cost subject to s(t)^s° and s(t):s (1+Y)S(M).
7 Denoting the discount rate
by r and differentiating the corresponding Lagrangean,
L=1 £[(1 + 0(1+ 8i)i~'ci[vi(0] + l[<r(tis°-s(t)] + n(ti(l+Y)s(t-l)-5(t)]],
t=li=l t=l
yields the following first order conditions, where an interior solution with 0<V;(t)<ej(t) is
guaranteed by (4):
!^ |^ (5)
Here, the Lagrangean multipliers o(t) and |x(t) satisfy the Kuhn-Tucker Theorem:
o(t)-[s°-s(t)] = 0 and fi(t)-[(l + y)s(t~l)-s(t)] = O. (6)
The interaction of these two multipliers governs the development of s(t) along the opti-
mal time path. Four points should be noted. First, the shadow price jx(t) is decreasing (or
non-increasing, respectively) in the course of time because neglecting the accompanying
constraint s(t)^(l+Y)s(t-l) would lead to a concave time path of s(t). Hence, denoting the
period when approaches zero by t', we observe (J-(t)=O for t=t', t'+l,..., T. Second, due to
natural disintegration, it can not be ruled out that s° might be reached before period T is
reached. A subsequent drop in stock, however, cannot be cost minimising. Hence, de-
noting the period when s° is reached by t", we observe X(t)>0 for t=t", t"+l, t"+2,..., T.
Third, according to the Kuhn-Tucker conditions (6) n(t)>0 implies o(t-l)=0 and o(t)>0
implies n(t+l)=O sucht that t'^t". Fourth, there may exist a number of subsequent periods
where neither s(t)s(l+Y)s(t-l) nor s(t)^s° are binding, i.e. [x(t)=a(t)=O
Combining together the above results indicates that the optimal time path of s(t) can be
divided into three subsequent phases that are distinguished by the respective signs of the
Lagrangean multipliers (see Figure 1): During Phase I (t=l,2,..,t'-l), the final stock s° is
not yet reached but the constraint s(t)s(l+Y)s(t-l) is binding and the accumulation of
greenhouse gases is slowed down compared to the unrestricted path (i.e. o(t)=0 and
|u(t)>0). During Phase II (t=t',t'+l,...,t"-l), none of the two constraints is binding (i.e.
o(t)= j.i(t)=O)and the accumulation of greenhouse gases is purely governed by dynamic
efficiency. During Phase III (t=t",t"+l,t"+2,...T), the final level s° is reached and the re-
maining greenhouse gas emissions have to be reduced to the level of natural degradation
(i.e. o(t)>0 and n(t)=O).
7 From a theoretical point of view, assuming a finite time horizon can be justified if T is suffi-
ciently large concerning the problem under consideration. The time horizon used in the sim-
ulation runs will cover the period of 1990 to 2110, i.e. 120 years (see Section 4).Figure 1. Optimal Accumulation of Greenhouse Gases.
s(t)
Phase I Phase II Phase III
o>0,
The actual partitioning of the time horizon - i.e. the location of t' and t" - depends on the
specification of the model parameters, where the discount rate r is of particular import-
ance. Ceteris paribus, an increase in r accelerates the accumulation of greenhouse gases
thereby extends Phases I and III and diminishsPhase II. Two polar extremes can be dis-
tinguished. For a sufficiently high r, Phase II may completely vanish such that the stock
s(t) grows with the maximum permissible rate y until the final level s° is reached. For a
sufficiently low r, the constraint s(t)^(l+y)s(t-l) may never bind and s° may be reached
just in T such that Phase II dominates the complete time path. This latter case may be
termed as the pure Hotelling-case since marginal abatement cost evolve according to a
modified Hotelling rule. Accounting for ds(x)ldvt{t)= -a;(l-^)
T~
r and inserting pi(t)=O
for t=l, .., T and o(t)=0 for t=l,...,T-l, (5) reduces to: ((l + r)(l + 8i))
1~'dcj(t)/dvi(t) =
a(T)a;(l-qj)
T~'. This leads to the following conditions which hold along the optimal
time path for any pair of pollutants {Gj, G,} and any pair of subsequent periods {t, t+1}:





(8)The interpretation of this special case is straightforward (see Michaelis, 1992a): Con-
dition (7) indicates the efficient combination of abatement activities within each period,
i.e. the static optimum, and (8) describes the movement of the system over time, i.e. the
dynamic efficiency conditions. According to (7) abatement activities have to be combin-
ed in such a way that the ratio of marginal abatement cost (corrected for technical pro-
gress) equals the ratio of the greenhouse coefficients multiplied by the weighted ratio of
the respective disintegration rates.
8 Consequently, the share of abatement activities re-
garding pollutant Gj is c.p. the greater the higher is the greenhouse coefficient a( and the
smaller is the disintegration rate qj. Moreover, the influence of the disintegration rates is
the stronger the longer is the remaining time horizon. In the course of time, the latter
effect leads to a shift in abatement effort towards greenhouse gases with comparatively
high disintegration rates. This reallocation can also be verified-by the dynamic efficiency
condition (8) which indicates that marginal abatement cost increase over time with the
These results, however, are only valid for the pure Hotelling-case with n(t)=O for t=l,..,T
and o(t)=0 for t=l,...,T-l. In the general case, the properties of the efficient time path are
less obvious, but it is possible to identify in which direction the general solution deviates





where the newly added terms ^(t) and Qj(t) are defined as follows:
Assuming qj>q;, the above definition of Wjj(t) implies ^(t^l where the strict inequality
holds for t=l,2,...,T-l. Hence, compared to the pure Hotelling case, the ratio between
marginal abatement cost of Gj and G; increases, i.e. one observes a shift in abatement ac-
8 In the special case of equal disintegration rates condition (7) simply requires that marginal
cost per unit of CO2-equivalent should be equalised across gases. This is of particular
importance with respect to CO2 and N2O the disintegration rates of which are almost identic-
al (see Section 4).tivities towards greenhouse gases with comparatively high disintegration rates. Recalling
the impact of the discount rate discussed above, this result does not come as a surprise.
In contrast to the always positive ^(t), the sign of Q\(t) depends on t:
1. For Phase I (l^t<t') with a(t)=0 and (i(t)>0 only little can be said about the behaviour
of £2j(t). Due to fx(t+l)<n(t) the numerator of Qj(t) is likely to become negative for a
sufficiently small y. The sign of the denominator, however, can not readily be deter-
mined such that Qj(t) may be either positive or negative. Hence, compared to the pure
Hotelling case the increase in marginal abatement cost between t and t+1 may be
either slowed down or accelerated.
2. For Phase II (t'st^t"-l), o(t)=fx(t)=0 implies Qj(t)=O. Consequently, marginal abate-
ment cost evolve according to the pure Hotelling case as described by (8).
3. For Phase III (t"stsT), o(t)>0 and n(t)=() implies 0<Qj(t)s'l where the strict inequality
holds for all t except t=T. Hence, the increase in marginal abatement cost between t
and t+1 is slowed down compared to the pure Hotelling case. It even cannot be ruled
out that marginal abatement cost decline over time.
All these effects can be found in the simulation results that will be presented in the sub-
sequent sections.
3. A Simulation Approach
Two sets of information are necessary for an empirical application of the above model:
first, the basic data on stocks and flows of greenhouse gases including a quantification of
the model's ecological constraints, and second, an appropriate specification of abatement
cost functions, of the discount rate and of the time horizon.
Stocks and Flows of Greenhouse Gases
To keep the demands on data availability and computational capacity within a manage-
able range, the model will be restricted to the five major greenhouse gases which to-
gether contribute about 90% to the man-made greenhouse effect: carbon dioxide (CO2),
methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O) and .the chlorofluorocarbons CFCll and CFC12.
9
The first line of Table 1 indicates the greenhouse gases' instantaneous greenhouse warm-
ing potentials ctj as published by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (see
9 Tropospheric ozone (O3), which also contributes significantly to global warming, cannot
readily be included into the simulation model because O3 is not directly emitted from
anthropogenic sources. Instead, O3 is created by highly complex and non-linear atmospheric
processes that involve nitrogen oxides, methane, carbon monoxide and other trace gases.Table 1. Basic Data on Greenhouse Gases.
Greenhouse warming potential CXJ
Atmospheric lifetime c; [years]
Disintegration rate q;
Initial stock s;(0) [10
6 tons]
Basic emissions ej(O) [10
6tons]









































Source: IPCC (1990); Enquete (1990, 1992); own calculations.
IPCC, 1990). The second line shows the gases' atmospheric lifetimes c; that have been
used to calculate the disintegration rates q, indicated in the third line of Table I.
1
0 The
fourth line shows the initial stocks of greenhouse gases in the earth's atmosphere at the
beginning of the nineties, and the fifth line indicates the basic emission levels that have
been adjusted to the initial stocks in such a way that for each gas the unrestricted growth
in stock corresponds to the respective growth in atmospheric concentration that actually
has been measured for the period of 1990 to 1991 (see, e.g., Enquete, 1992). Finally, the
growth rates Yj shown in the sixth line of Table 1 have been calculated according to the
IPCC's long-term 'business as usual'-scenario for CO2, CH4 and N2O, whereas CFC11
and CFC12 are assumed to increase by 0.5% per year under status quo-conditions, i.e.
without the provisions of the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone
Layer (see, e.g., Markandya, 1.991).
According to the UNEP Advisory Group on Greenhouse Gases, two temperature targets
have to be pursued in order to " ...limit the risk of rapid, unpredictable, and non-linear re-
sponses that could lead to extensive ecosystem damages": First, the absolute rise in global
mean temperature should not exceed 1-2°C above preindustrial levels; and second, the
rate of change in temperature should not exceed 0.1°C per decade (see Swart/Hootsmans,
As shown in Michael is (1992a), qj can be calculated from Cj using g;=l-exp(-l/c,;). It
should be noted, however, that the atmospheric lifetime of CO2 is subject to considerable un-
certainty. The estimates range from 50 to 200 years (see Enquete, 1992, p. 37). The above
used figure of 180 years has been chosen because it leads to a calculated magnitude of basic
emissions that is in line with the actual emissions of CO2 estimated for 1990.1991, p.131). To translate these targets into the model's constraint, the well known rela-
tionship between global mean temperature and greenhouse gas concentrations can be
used (see, e.g., Cline, 1992):
AT = 6.3AjSln(C/C0). (9)
Here, AT is the increase in global mean temperature compared to preindustrial levels(in
°C), X and p are climate parameters, and C/CQ indicates the ratio between the actual at-
mospheric concentration of greenhouse gases and the respective preindustrial concentra-
tion (both figures measured in terms of CO2-equivalents). Assuming an absolute temper-
ature target of AT=sl.5°C, equation (9) can be reformulated as: C/C0se°-
254^P. Account-
ing for A=0.3 and |3=1.9 (see, e.g., Cline, 1992) this condition requires that the increase
in the concentration of greenhouse gases compared to preindustrial levels should be lim-
ited to approximately 56.15%.
l
l A large part of this global greenhouse budget, however,
has already been used up. For 1990 - the model's base year - it can be calculated that the
concentration of greenhouse gases was already about 35.2% above preindustrial levels
(see Enquete, 1992). Hence, with 1990 as base year the further increase in the concen-
tration of greenhouse gases has to be limited to about 15.5%. Since there exists a constant
relationship between the stock of greenhouse gases and their atmospheric concentration
this limitation implies for the above model that the stock s(t) should not exceed the upper
bound of 1.155-s(0). Similarly, it can be calculated that the growth in s(t) should not ex-
ceed 2.8 % per decade in order to restrict the rate of change in global mean temperature
to 0.1°C per decade. It should be stressed again, however, that all these figures are
subject to considerable uncertainties. The same reservation applies to the cost data
discussed in the following subsection.
Abatement Cost, Discount Rate and Time Horizon
A simple functional form of Cj[vj(t)] that satisfies all requirements formulated in (4) is
given by:
To calibrate this cost function for the different greenhouse gases, a uniform percentage
reduction of 20% compared to the initial basic emissions is chosen as point of reference.
1
1 Whereas the magnitude of A.=0.3 is a widely agreed figure, the magnitude of (3, the so-called
'feedback multiplier', has caused considerable controversy. The estimates range from a lower
bound of 1.1 to an upper bound of 3.4. According to Cline (1992), the figure employed above,
1.9, has to be viewed as the 'best guess' of (3. Using instead the lower or upper bound of P
would lead to C/C0^2.16 or C/C0^1.28, respectively.10
Denoting marginal abatement cost calculated at this benchmark by MQ and accounting






In quantifying the magnitude of MC, it should be recognised that the present model deals
with global emissions such that (10) has to be interpreted as a global cost function.
1
2
Concerning CO2 abatement by energy-related policies (like, e.g., fuel-switching) a
widely accepted estimate of MQ is $ 45 per ton of carbon (see Nordhaus, 1991). How-
ever, only about 80-85% of global CO2 emissions can be traced back to the combustion
of fossil fuels whereas the remaining 15-20% are caused by deforestation mainly in
tropical regions. There is ample empirical evidence that limiting deforestation is much
more efficient in terms of abatement cost per ton of carbon than energy-related meas-
ures. For example, Cline (1992) estimates that by limiting deforestation in just three
countries (Brazil, Indonesia, Cote D'lvoir) global CO2 emissions could be reduced by
about 6-8% at average cost of only $ 6 per ton of carbon. In order to capture such low-
cost options, it is assumed that an overall least-cost strategy encompassing forestry as
well as energy policies would incur marginal cost of only $ 30 at a 20% reduction level.
Accounting for a conversion rate of 3.7 tons of CO2 per ton of carbon implies marginal
cost of about $ 8 per ton of CO2. The resulting marginal cost curve shown in Figure 2 is
roughly in line with the "consensus" estimate calculated by Nordhaus (1991).
Concerning the other greenhouse gases under consideration, only sketchy information on
abatement cost is available. In the case of CFCs, the UNEP Economic Assessment Panel
on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer has estimated marginal substitution cost
between 0 and 15 $/kg for reduction levels up to 30% (see UNEP, 1989). Similar results
have been obtained by Smith/Vodden (1990) within the framework of detailed cost
engineering studies. Based on these findings and accounting for the likely impact of
technical progress within the last few years it seems reasonable to assume that marginal
abatement cost at a 20% reduction level amount to 5,000 $ per ton of CFC.
According to the IPCC (1992), the use of nitrogen fertiliser has to be regarded as the
main source of global anthropogenic N2O emissions.
1
3 Empirical evidence suggests that
an average of about 3.2% of the utilised nitrogen is converted into N2O and emitted the to
1
2 It should carefully be noted that the use o( global cost functions implies the assumption thai
it is possible to ensure an elTicicnl international allocation of abatement activities by multi-
lateral negotiations between the involved countries (see, e.g., Barrett, 1991; Stabler, 1993).
1
3 Until the beginning of the nineties, it was falsely believed that also the combustion of fossil
fuels is a significant source of nitrous oxide (see, e.g., Enquete, 1992).11
Figure 2. Assumed Marginal Cost of CO2 Reduction in t=1990 ($ per ton of CO2).
Percentage Reduction in CO2 Emissions
Source: Own calculations based on Table 2 and equation (10).
atmosphere (ibd).
1
4 Accounting for the relative molecular mass of nitrogen and oxygen
leads to an average emission coefficient of about 0.05 tons of N2O per ton of nitrogen.
Hence, reducing the emissions of N2O by one ton requires an average reduction in agri-
cultural input of nitrogen of about 20 tons. Assuming that prices remain unchanged, the
social cost of reducing nitrogen input can be approximated by the farmers' loss in income
corrected for possible subsidies. For example, in West Germany the annual input of ni-
trogen amounts to about 1,500,000 tons at a price of $ 650 per ton (see Statistisches Bun-
desamt, 1991). Assuming that farmers behave rational (i.e. price of nitrogen = value of
marginal product) and that nitrogen demand is given by a linear demand curve with an
elasticity of -0.5 at current prices (see Andreasson, 1989), marginal loss in income at a
20% reduction level amounts to $ 260 per ton of nitrogen or $ 5,200 per ton of N2O, re-
spectively. This figure, however, is only a rough guess. On the one hand, it may overes-
timate the true social cost of reducing nitrogen consumption since it is not corrected for
subsidies. But on the other hand, from a global point of view it may underestimate social
cost because the above calculation can not readily be applied to the developing countries
of the southern hemisphere. In view of these uncertainties, it seems reasonable to assume
marginal cost of $ 8,000 per of N2O in the base run and to calculate additionally a low-
cost and a high-cost scenario with $ 4,000 and $ 12,000 respectively.
1
4 This figure includes also the indirect effects caused by leaching of nitrogen into ground water.12




CO2 CH4 N2O CFC11 CFC12
8 2,000 4,000 5,000 5,000
8 6,000 8,000 5,000 5,000
8 10,000 12,000 5,000 5,000
Source: Cline (1992); Nordhaus (1991); own calculations.
In the case of methane, the variety of emission sources makes any cost estimate very dif-
ficult. Six different economic activities contribute significantly to global emissions (see,
e.g., Enquete, 1992): Cultivation of rice, coal mining, landfill tipping, distribution of
natural gas, deforestation and intensive livestock (ruminants). However, due to nutritional
problems in many developing countries, reducing the cultivation of rice would involve
tremendous opportunity cost. Similarly, installing capital-intensive gas insulation equip-
ment at coal mines and landfills or overhauling leaky gas distribution systems can hardly
be viewed as low-cost options for reducing CH4 emissions. As a consequence, it seems
reasonable to suppose that any least-cost strategy for reducing CH4 emissions should
first of all focus on limiting deforestation and intensive livestock. This assumption, how-
ever, implies a 'joint abatement'-problem since limiting deforestation has already been
identified as a low-cost option for reducing anthropogenous CO2 emissions.
1
5 In order to
capture this effect it is assumed that the least-cost strategy for reducing CO2 involves a
strict ranking of policies: The first 10% in emission reductions are achieved solely by
limiting deforestation, whereas further reductions are achieved by energy-related poli-
cies. Moreover, it is assumed that each percentage of CO2 reduction via limiting defores-
tation yields as extra benefit another percentage of emission reduction in CH4.
1
6 This
implies that the origin of the abatement cost curve for CH4 is shifted to the right, such
that the first p percent of reductions are obtained at zero cost, where p equals the per-
centage reduction in CO2 emissions up to the assumed limit of 10%.
1
5 Energy-related policies for reducing CO2 emissions may also have an impact on CH4 emis-
sions. These interdependencies, however, are neglected in the present analysis since their
magnitude and even their direction is not clear: Whereas improvements in energy efficiency
would probably lead to a decrease in CH4 emissions from coal mining and gas distribution, it
cannot be ruled out that switching from high-carbon fuels (coal, oil) to low-carbon fuels
(natural gas) may lead to an increase in CH4 emissions (see, e.g., Jackson, 1991).
1
6 Based on an average carbon content of 50 tons per hectare of mature tropical rain forest (see
e.g., Brown, 1992) and assuming the emission factors estimated by Lobert et al. (1993), the
burning of one hectar of rain forest leads to about 185 tons of CO2 and 3 tons of CH4. This
ratio of 185:3 roughly equals the ratio of basic emission levels (see Table 1) such that reduc-
ing CO2 emission by one percent via limiting deforestation implies that CH4 emissions are
also reduced by about one percent.13
In addition to forestry policies, limiting intensive livestock is another low-cost option for
reducing CH4 emissions.
1
7 Among all ruminants, milk cows exhibit by far the highest
'emission coefficient' - about 0.1 tons of CH4 per year and cow (see, e.g., Sauerbeck/
Brunnert, 1990). In a perfectly competitive environment, the social cost of slaughtering a
milk cow equal the individual farmer's loss in income corrected for the induced price ef-
fects on producers' and consumers' surplus. However, in most countries the market for
milk is regulated by quotas and price floors such that there is considerable scope for re-
ducing the number of milk cows without significantly increasing milk prices. Hence up
to a certain degree social cost can be approximated solely by the farmers' loss in income.
For example, in West Germany the_farmers' average net income from milk production
amounts to about $ 600 per cow and year or $ 6,000 per ton of CH4, respectively (see
Bundesregierung, 1992). For several reasons, however^ this figure is only a very crude
guess of abatement cost. First, it includes a certain amount of indirect subsidies caused
by the regulations mentioned. Second, it indicates average and not marginal cost as re-
quired by equation (11). And third, it applies only to milk cows but not to other types of
ruminants that exhibit smaller emission coefficients and consequently higher unit cost.
Therefore, the base run which assumes marginal cost of $ 6,000 per ton of CH4 is supple-
mented by a low-cost scenario and a high-cost scenario which assume marginal cost of $
2,000 and $ 10,000, respectively (see Table 2).
The coefficients a( derived from (11) establish the initial position of the abatement cost
curves, whereas the likely impact of technical progress is captured by the shift parameters
Sj (see Section 2). Empirical estimates on the long-run development of abatement cost
are not available, but it seems reasonable to adopt a not too optimistic view of the future
cost saving potentials. Therefore, technical progress is assumed to diminish abatement
cost of CO2 by 0.25% per year (i.e. 6X= 0.0025). Concerning CFCs higher (but still
moderate) shift parameters 64=65=0.005 are employed, and for N2O and CH4 no cost
saving progress at all is assumed (i.e. 62=63=0).
Finally, the discount rate and the time horizon have to be specified. Discounting future
cost and benefits is known to be a crucial factor in analysing long-term environmental
problems. Discount rates in the range of 5 to 10%, usually employed in public policy
analysis, are widely believed to be inappropriate in the case of global warming because
they imply an almost complete disregard of long-term effects (see, e.g., Cline 1992).
Therefore, the following simulations employ a moderate discount rate of r=3.5%. It
should carefully be noted, however, that the impact of discounting is less dramatic in the
1
7 Methane production per unit of livestock can hardly be influenced by measures like changes
in feeding, and low-cost technologies to prevent the ruminants' digestive gases from escaping
to the atmosphere are not available (see Sauerbeck/Brunnert, 1990). Consequently, the only
practicable way to reduce emissions caused by livestock is a reduction in livestock itself.14
present model than in usual cost-benefit-analysis. In the latter, increasing the discount
rate typically leads to more damages in the long run. In contrast to this, the ecological
constraints are fixed in the present model such that changing the discount rate induces
only an intertemporal reallocation of abatement cost.
In determining an appropriate time horizon it should be recognised that global warming
is predominantly caused by fossil fuel combustion. Hence, due to the finite resource base
(coal, oil, gas) an infinite time horizon would clearly be inadequate. Instead, it seems
reasonable to employ a finite time horizon that is long enough to allow for the occurrence
of a low-cost noncarbon-technology for energy generation that will cut greenhouse gas
emissions by an amount large enough to resolve the problem of global warming. For the
present analysis, a time horizon of 120 years (1990 to 2110) has been chosen. However,
experimentation with alternative time horizons has shown that prolonging T by some de-
cades has no significant impact on the allocation of abatement activities during the first
70 to 80 years. In particular, the period when the final stock s° is reached turned out to
be insensitive with respect to increases in T.
4. Simulation Results: The Base Run Scenario
The main simulation results
1
8 for the base run scenario are summarised in Figures 3 to 6.
Figure 3 shows the development of the total stock of greenhouse gases, s(t), along the
efficient time path. Moreover, the dashed line marked as 'unrestricted path' indicates the
development of s(t) that would result from cost minimisation without taking into account
the additional constraint s(t)s(l+Y)s(i-l). Two conclusions can be drawn from this figure.
Firstly, even with moderate discounting (r=3.5%), economic efficiency and ecological
stability cannot be brought into line during the first decades (see 'Phase I'): In order to
avoid the risk of a breakdown of vulnerable ecosystems, the accumulation of greenhouse
gases has to be slowed down compared to the unrestricted path which is purely driven by
dynamic efficiency. Secondly, the maximum permissible stock of greenhouse gases will
already be reached in 2060, i.e. half a century before the end of the planning horizon is
reached (see 'Phase III'). Hence, even with moderate discounting and only slow technical
progress, the existence of comparatively large natural disintegration capacities justifies a
policy that exhausts the remaining 'greenhouse budget' within the first 70 years, such that
after 2060 emissions have to be reduced to the level of natural degradation.
1
8 All simulation runs have been calculated using the professional 2.05 version of GAMS-MINOS
(see Brooke et al., 1988) on a VAX/VMS. TO keep the demands on computational capacity
within a manageable range, each time period covers five years. More detailed information on
input files, model statistics and numerical results are available on request.15
Figure 3. Base Run Scenario: Accumulation of Greenhouse Gases.
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Figure 4 shows the percentage reduction in greenhouse gas emissions - i.e. the ratio bet-
ween Vj(t) and e;(t) - along the efficient time path. Concerning CFCs the model predicts
reduction rates that start that at 70-80% and converge to a final level of about 96-98%.
These results suggest that an almost complete phasing out of CFCs - as laid down in the
Montreal Protocol and its London amendments - could already be justified by global
warming without taking into account the additional damages caused to the earth's ozone
layer.
1
9 A second important implication of Figure 4 applies to the role of CH4 and N2O.
Particularly during the second half of the time horizon, overall efficiency requires signif-
icant reductions in these two greenhouse gases.
2
0 Hence, a 'piecemeal approach' which
ignores reduction possibilities related to CH4 and N2O could lead to an allocation far
from efficiency. The possible amount of excessive abatement cost imposed on society by
such an approach will be discussed in Section 5.
1
9 Recently, the role of CFCs has become subject to controversy because new scientific evidence
indicates that their direct effect on global warming may partly be compensated by their ozone
stripping impact (see Cline, 1992). To check the sensitivity of the above results, an additional
run with ten times smaller warming potentials (a4=397, a5=575) has been calculated. The re-
sulting reallocation of abatement effort, however, turned out to be only of minor significance:
The long-term reduction in CFC11 (CFC12) decreases from 96% (98%) to 83% (88%), where-
as the other reduction rates remain almost constant (see Figure A.7 in the Appendix).
2
0 Note, however, that during the first halfoi the time horizon the percentage reduction in CH4
emissions does not significantly exceed the zero cost (joint abatement) level of 10 %.16
Figure 4. Base Run Scenario: Percentage Reduction in Greenhouse Gas Emissions.
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The most striking implications of Figure 4, however, are related to CO2. Here; the per-
centage reduction in emissions starts at 34.3 % and increases up to a final levePof 81.5 %
in 2110. These percentages are much higher than the reduction targets of 20 or 25% that
are presently discussed at the political level (see, e.g., Schmidt, 1992). Consequently, a
reorientation towards the ecologically more ambitious stabilisation approach would have
a dramatic impact on today's greenhouse policies. In particular, reduction levels in the
order of magnitude as indicated above are accompanied by correspondingly high marginal
abatement cost. Figure 5 shows the development of marginal cost concerning CO2, CH4
and N2O calculated in terms of $ per ton of gas.
2
1 These figures can also be interpreted
as the tax rates that would be necessary to decentralise the efficient solution (see Micha-
elis, 1992a). Hence, the tax rate necessary to induce the required reductions in CO2 emis-
sions starts at about $ 16 per ton of CO2 (or $ 60/t carbon, respectively) and gradually
increases up to a final level of almost $ 190 per ton of CO2. In order to give a first clue to
the likely impact of a such a tax, it may be noted that the initial rate of $ 16/ton CO2
would increase the current U.S. coal prices by a factor of about 2Vi.
As pointed out in Section 3, however, the present analysis relies on cost data concerning
CH4 and-N2O that are highly uncertain. Hence, it might be asked how the above results
will change when switching to one of the other cost scenarios shown in Table 2. The con-
sequences of such an alteration are clear in principle: Switching to the low cost (high cost)
scenario leads to an reallocation in abatement effort that 1) accelerates (slows down) the
percentage reduction in CH4 and N2O emissions and 2) slows down (accelerates) the per-
centage reduction in CO2 and CFC emissions. These reallocations, however, turned out
to have only a moderate effect on the taxation of CO2 (see Figures A.2 to A.5 in the Ap-
pendix): Switching to the high cost (low cost) scenario shifts the initial lax rate from $
16 to $ 16.5 ($ 14.5) and the final tax rate from $ 190 to $ 210 ($ 155) per ton of CO2.
Finally, Figure 6 indicates that the present value of aggregated annual abatement cost
2
2
starts at a level of about $ 80 billion and gradually declines to about $ 65 billion at the
beginning of the next century. Subsequently, annual cost rise to a maximum level of
about $ 150 billion in 2060 and then start to decline again until a final level of about $
100 billion is reached.
2
3 These cost figures are enormous in absolute terms, but they are
2
1 For diagrammatic reasons the respective figures concerning CFCs are not shown above. Mar-
ginal cost start at about $ 40,000 ($ 85,000) and increase up to a final level of about $ 900,000
($ 1,500,000) per ton ofCFCTl (CFC12).
2
2 The numbers above are averages of the respective five-year periods calculated by the model.
2
3 The peak in cost is reached just when the stock of greenhouse gases reaches it's maximum.
The subsequent decline of cost is due to a reallocation in abatement activities motivated by
the closer coming end of the time horizon: The smaller the number of years ahead; the less
important is the long-term impact of the different gases and the more long-lived gasSs will be
emitted. Consequently, the percentage reduction ratios shown in Figure 3 imply decreasing
emissions of CH4 and increasing emissions of the other gases during the last decades-/18
Figure 6. Base Run Scenario: The Cost of Stabilising the Global Greenhouse.
not too dramatic compared to the total size of the world economy. Assuming an initial
base-line world GNP of $ 22,500 billion (see World Bank, 1992) and a growth rate of 2%
p.a., leads to the estimate that the cost of 'stabilising the global greenhouse' would start at
about 0.36% of world GNP in 1990 and rise to a maximum of about 2.4% of world GNP
in the year 2110.
2
4
5. The Cost of a Piecemeal Approach
The above analysis was based on the assumption of a comprehensive policy approach
that tackles all major greenhouse gases simultaneously. In contrast to this, today's green-
house policies concentrate almost exclusively on CO2 emissions. There are virtually no
regulations aiming at CH4 or N2O, and the current regulations concerning CFCs are mo-
tivated solely by protecting the ozone layer. In order to quantify the possible amount of
excessive abatement cost caused by such a piecemeal approach, an additional scenario
based on the following two assumptions has been calculated: 1) The reductions in CFC
emissions follow an exogenously determined 'Montreal Path' that is assumed to start at
2
4 The latter figure, of course, depends crucially on the employed growth rate of world GNP.
Assuming a growth rate of only 1.5% increases the long-term cost of sustainable greenhouse
policies from 2.4% to about 4.1 % of world GNP.19






40% and to increase to a final level of 95%.
2
5 2) The reductions in CH4 emissions are re-
stricted to the joint abatement level caused by CO2 policies and N2O emissions com-
pletely are unrestricted.
Figure 7 shows the resulting percentage reductions in greenhouse gas emissions. Addi-
tionally, the dashed line marked as 'base run
1 replicates the percentage reduction in CO2
calculated for the comprehensive approach (compare Figure 4). Comparing the two time
paths concerning CO2 indicates that switching from the comprehensive to the piecemeal
approach increases the reduction in CO2 emissions by about 3 to 8.5 percentages. At first
glance, this difference might appear surprisingly small. It should be recognised, however,
that each percentage of reductions in CO2 emissions involves some hundred million tons
of CO2 in absolute terms. Moreover, due to increasing marginal cost, a comparatively
small expansion of abatement effort starting from an already high abatement level may
have considerable economic consequences. This is illustrated by Figure 8 which displays
2
5 It should be noted that the quantification of a 'Montreal Path' is subject to considerable uncer-
tainties (see, e.g., OTA, 1989). In particular, the number of countries that ultimatelynvill rati-
fy the protocol and the extent to which the parties will comply with the protocol is unknown
yet. The above assumed time path implies a rather optimistic view of the Montreal' Protocol.
However, due to the small absolute contribution of CFCs to the total stock of greenhouse
gases, a variation in the assumed time path has only minor impacts on the overall results.20
Figure 8. Piecemeal Approach versus Comprehensive Approach: Marginal Cost of CO2
Reduction ($/ton of CO2).









the development of marginal cost of CO2 abatement along the two different time paths:
Switching from the comprehensive to the piecemeal approach leads to a sharp increase in
tax rates during the second half of the time horizon.
Figure 9 shows the present value of annual abatement cost under piecemeal assumptions,
where the dark shaded areas indicate the additional cost compared to the comprehensive
approach. Over the whole time horizon, the additional cost sum up to about $ 1,800 bil-
lion that equal 14,5% of the total cost implied by the comprehensive approach. These ad-
ditional cost, however, are not evenly distributed over time. Instead, about % of them
ac-crue during the last 50 years. Hence, excessive abatement cost caused by the
piecemeal approach may be of moderate size for the first decades. However, in the
course of time they will grow up to a considerable burden on future generations.
Of course, the amount of excessive abatement cost indicating the relative inefficiency of
the piecemeal approach depends crucially on the reference case that determines the effi-
cient (comprehensive) solution. Here, the assumed cost of reducing CH4 and N2O emis-
sions are of particular importance. The higher these cost, the lower are the losses in effi-
ciency associated with the piecemeal approach. However, in an additional simulation run,
it turned out that switching to the high cost scenario (see Table 2) decreases excessive
cost only by about $ 400 billion, i.e. the remaining losses in efficiency still amount to
about $ 1,400 billion (see Figure A.7 in the Appendix). This result suggests that even
under favourable conditions - i.e. comparatively high abatement cost concerning CH4 and
N2O - the piecemeal approach would lead to an allocation far from efficiency.
6. The Cost and Benefits of 'Waiting for Good News'
The analysis in Sections 4 and 5 was based on the hypothesis that there really exists a se-
vere greenhouse problem that warrants aggressive abatement measures. However, up to
now scientific evidence does not allow to draw definite conclusions concerning the extent
and the likely consequences of global warming. In order to cope with these uncertainties,
Manne/Richels (1991) propose to spent only moderate abatement effort during a learning
phase of three decades and thereafter to switch to a tightened 'catch up'-policy if new sci-
entific evidence reveals that greenhouse damage would really be severe. They estimate
that this 'wait and learn'-strategy could save the United States about $ 90 billion com-
pared to immediately introducing far-reaching abatement measures. These optimistic re-
sults did not remain unchallenged in the literature (see Cline, 1992). But nevertheless,
the basic idea of reducing cost by postponing part of the abatement effort unujefurther
scientific evidence will emerge, might be an appropriate response to the present-uncer-
tainties surrounding global warming.22
Figure 10. Ten-year Moratorium: Percentage Reduction in Greenhouse Gas Emissions.
In order to explore the implications of such a 'wait and learn'-strategy for the model under
consideration, an additional simulation run with a ten-year moratorium has been calcu-
lated. Specifically, it has been assumed that during the first decade no reduction measures
concerning CO2, N2O and CH4 are taken, whereas the reductions in CFC emissions fol-
low the 'Montreal Path' introduced in the last Section (see Figure 10).
2
6 Comparing the
resulting time path shown in Figure 10 with the original path shown in Figure 2 reveals
that the ten-year moratorium necessitates a considerable tightening of abatement meas-
ures during the following decades. Denoting the present value of abatement cost saved
during the first decade by AC1 = $ 747 billion and denoting the present value of addi-
tional abatement cost accruing during the following decades by AC2 = $ 865 billion leads
to a net increase in abatement cost of | ACX - ACj | = $ 118 billion.
This figure, however, does not reflect the complete cost of waiting since it neglects those
damages D^0 that might be caused by violating the constraint s(t)£(l+y)s(t-l) during the
first decade.
2
7 But there are also potential benefits from waiting since the learning phase
2
6 As pointed out by Cline (1992), due to the risk of irreversible damages during the learning
phase a moratorium of only 10 years seems to be more appropriate than 30 years as assumed
by Manne/Richels (1991).
2
7 The growth in stock s(t) during the first decade amounts to about 6% compared to a maxi-
mum permissible growth of only 2.8% (see Section 4).23
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the greenhouse effect may qualify as a mere chimera. Denoting the probability of this
'good news' by x and assuming risk neutrality, the expected net benefit from waiting is
positive if the condition jt> 1 -[AC^AC^+D)] holds. Hence, for given cost differences
ACj and AC2 the profitability of waiting depends on the relationship between the proba-
bility of 'good news' on the one hand and the accumulation damages eventually caused
during the learning phase on the other hand. Accounting for AQ = $ 747 billion and AC2
= $ 865 billion, condition (12) implies that a probability of 'good news' of 20% - as sug-
gested by Cline (1992) - suffices to justify a ten-year moratorium if the accumulation
damages do not exceed a magnitude of about $ 68 billion. And even with accumulation
damages as high as $ 300 billion, a probability of only 35% would be required in order
to generate a positive expected net benefit (see Figure 11). Hence, even with a compara-
tively low probability of 'good news' it might pay to wait and learn.
Finally, it should be emphasised that these calculations are only intended to give a first
clue to the likely profitability of a moratorium. At least two shortcomings of the above
analysis warrant further research. First, the oversimplified 'bang bang'-structure of the
employed probability distribution is clearly inadequate. In particular, it might turn out
during the learning phase that global warming is in fact a problem but it is less severe24
than previously suspected. And second, there may exist technological irreversibilities
particularly associated with the reduction of CO2 may (see Stahler, 1993) such that
switching between different reduction paths is costly. An inclusion of this latter aspect
would induce an additional bias in favour of waiting.
7. Summary and Conclusion
The present study has investigated the economic implications of a comprehensive policy
approach that strives to stabilise the atmospheric concentration of greenhouse gases at an
ecologically determined threshold level that restricts the rise in global mean temperature
to about 1.5°C compared to preindustrial times. In a theoretical optimisation model, con-
ditions for an efficient allocation of abatement effort among pollutants and over time have
been derived. In order to calculate efficient time paths of greenhouse gas control together
with the corresponding tax schemes, the model has been empirically specified and adapted
to a dynamic GAMS-algorithm that covers the period of 1990 to 2110. Given the input da-
ta and cost parameters assumed in this paper, the model predicts that the stabilisation tar-
get will be reached by the year 2060 such that for the remaining time horizon emissions
have to be reduced to the level of natural degradation. The corresponding tax scheme
2
8
implies a price per ton of CO2 that starts at about $ 16 and increases up to a final level of
almost $ 190 in 2110. The respective tax rates on CH4, N2O and CFCs are considerably
higher due to the higher dynamic greenhouse potential of these gases. In particular, the
tax rates on CFCs can be considered as prohibitive, such that a total ban of these sub-
stances could already be justified by their impact on global warming.
The present value of total abatement cost associated with the above stabilisation target is
estimated to range from about $ 80 billion p.a. at the beginning of the time horizon to a
maximum level of $ 150 billion p.a. in the year 2060. These figures, however, are derived
from an efficient policy approach that tackles all major greenhouse gases simultaneously.
In contrast to this, today's greenhouse policies are usually restricted to limiting CO2-emis-
sions. For this case, the model predicts excessive abatement cost that sum up to a present
value of about $ 1,800 billion. Although these empirical results are subject to several un-
certainties, their basic policy implication can hardly be doubted: An efficient solution to
global warming requires a comprehensive approach that would not only affect forestry
policies and fossile fuel consumption but also modern agriculture which contributes
significantly to the atmospheric accumulation of methane and nitrous oxide.
2
8 On the practical properties of such a tex scheme, like, e.g., the definition of the assessment
base, see Michaelis (1992a).25
However, in view of the substantial cost burden quoted above and accounting for the vast
uncertainties surrounding climate change, a 'wait and learn'-strategy as originally pro-
posed by Manne/Richels (1991) might be considered as a reasonable alternative com-
pared to immediately introducing far reaching abatement measures. In principle,IKe eval-
uation of such a strategy depends on the relationship between the probability :o*f 'good
news' and the additional cost caused during the learning phase. Given the input data and
cost parameters assumed in this paper, the model predicts that a 10-year moratorium
might be reasonable even if the probability of 'good news' is comparatively low.
Finally, it is instructive to compare the above results with those obtained by other authors
applying explicit cost-benefit-analysis to the problem of global warming. The most com-
prehensive studies in this field are those of Cline (1992) and-Nordhaus (1993). Nordhaus
calculates an optimal transition path for controlling CO2 and CFCs together that starts at
a reduction level of about 10% and increases up to about 15% in 2105. As claimed by
Nordhaus, within the next 120 years this time path implies an increase in global mean
temperature of about 3.2°C compared to preindustrial levels. This calculation, however,
does not account for the impact of uncontrolled CH4 and N2O emissions. Hence, the true
increase in temperature might be considerably higher. In the light of long-term risk
management, as proposed by the UNEP Advisory Group on Greenhouse Gases, such an
outcome has to be viewed as unacceptable.
Cline (1992) assumes an 'aggressive' approach to climate change that aims at reducing
global CO2 emissions to an annual level of 4 GtC (which implies an initial reduction in
emissions of about 40%). He calculates the corresponding benefit-cost-ratio for a number
of scenarios that differ by the assumed key parameters: discount rate, climate sensitivity
and warming damages. In contrast to Nordhaus (1993), the results obtained by Cline
(1992) suggest that aggressive abatement measures can be justified for a wide range of
reasonable key parameters.
2
9 These findings are of particular interest with respect to the
present study because the emission target assumed by Cline (1992) is roughly in line
with the stabilisation target assumed in the above simulations.
3
0 Hence, there is evidence
that the above stabilisation scenario can be justified in terms of cost and benefits although
the present study did not explicitly deal with quantifying warming damages.
2
9 The differences between the results of Cline (1992) and Nordhaus (1993) are due tcyj num-
ber of differing assumptions among which the employed discount rates play a key role.,
30 The long term reduction rates calculated for the base run scenario (sec Figure 3) imply an-
nual net emissions of greenhouse gases in the order of magnitude of 4-5 GtC. - -26
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Appendix
Figure A.I. Percentage Reduction in Greenhouse Gas Emissions: The Case of Reduced
Greenhouse Warming Potentials of CFCs (a4=397 and a4=575).27
Figure A.2. Low Cost Scenario: Percentage Reduction in Greenhouse Gas Emissions.
Figure A.3. High Cost Scenario: Percentage Reduction in Greenhouse Gas Emissions.28
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Figure A.6. Piecemeal Approach versus Comprehensive Approach (Low Cost Sce-
nario): Present Value of Annual Abatement Cost.
Additional cost compared
to comprehensive approach
Figure A.7. Piecemeal Approach versus Comprehensive Approach (High Cost Sce-
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